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1. Overview
This book is the English revised and augmented version of the book entitled Pre´cis de
philosophie des sciences’ (Barberousse et al., 2011). Its purpose is to present the main
questions and answers addressed in today’s philosophy of science. Its target audience
should be both students and researchers in this field. All contributors are recognized
academics and any reader would probably learn a lot by reading this book.
The preface points out that ‘the two parts of The philosophy of science mirror the
traditional distinction between general philosophy of science and philosophy of the special
sciences’. Let us give a quick overview of each contribution in these two parts.
The first three articles, entitled Scientific explanation, Confirmation and induction, and
Causality, written, respectively, by D. Bonnay, M. Cozic and M. Kistler, deal with much
the same subject from different angles, that is the opposition between deductive–
nomological explanations and inductive–statistical explanations. To see the wealth and
complexity of epistemological questions related to understanding the nature of scientific
theories, the reading of these papers is recommended. The five articles that follow these
first three do not seem to have the same thematic unity. The fourth, Metaphysics of
science as naturalized metaphysics (by M. Esfeld) ‘investigates how metaphysics of
science qua naturalized metaphysics can work when taking fundamental physics and
more precisely, quantum mechanics as a guideline’. Chapter 5, entitled Theory and
models and written by M. Vorms, provides insights into contemporary philosophical
perspectives on the nature and structure of scientific theories. In chapter 6 (Scientific
change), A. Barberousse and M. Vorms stress the dynamic nature of science and develop
different philosophical options to explain it. This first part of this companion ends on two
contemporary topics. In chapter 7, Barberousse describes the new opposition between
Philosophy of science and science studies, the latter focusing on sociological factors of
scientific development. Last, it seems at first sight difficult to understand why P. Ludwig’s
paper on Reduction and emergence, which mainly concerns the conceptual difficulties of
physicalist reductionism to solve the famous mind–body problem, is the eighth and
concluding paper of this first part. But probably Ludwig answers this question in pointing
out at the end of his paper that there are explanatory limits of scientific theories at any
given moment of history. Indeed, the mind–body problem is the example par excellence of
these limits.
The second part is dedicated to the philosophy of special sciences and it could be itself
divided into two parts. First, the expected topics: Philosophy of logic (by P. de Rouilhan),
Philosophy of mathematics (by D. Bonnay and J. Dubucs), Philosophy of physics (by A.
Barberousse) and Philosophy of biology (by T. Pradeu). Second, matters more rarely
discussed in philosophy of science: Philosophy of medicine (by E´. Giroux and M.
Lemoine), Philosophy of social sciences (by J. Elster and H. Landermore), Philosophy of
economics (by M. Cozic), Philosophy of cognitive science (by D. Andler) and Philosophy
of linguistics (by P. E´gre´).
2. Some critical remarks
I am going to begin this critical section with a fear: despite the excellent academic quality
of each chapter, I cannot help imagining the difficulties of some readers (especially
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students in philosophy) because of a certain perplexity caused
by some unclear statements throughout the first part of this
book, like, for example, the statement more or less shared by
chapters 1 and 3 regarding ‘the abandonment of the deduc-
tive–nomological model’. Reading these two chapters, it was
difficult for me to understand how the deductive–nomological
model is actually abandoned and the reasons why it should be,
except maybe because of the impossibility of unifying the
sciences on a model specific to physics: hence a return to the
use of the category of causality, more consensual but also
vaguer. That scientific knowledge and methods can in prin-
ciple be unified is a claim that appears here as one of the
implicit dogmas of the metaphysics and philosophy of
contemporary science.
The treatment of the theory of probability to understand
the role of induction in sciences also was for me a cause of
philosophical frustration. It is indisputable that Cozic’s paper,
i.e. chapter 2 (Confirmation and induction), is a masterful
overview that is necessary, for example, to understand clearly
the distinction between deductive–nomological explanation
and inductive–statistical explanation. But given the impor-
tance given to probability theory in chapters 4, 5 and 6, it is a
pity that the foundational problem of the interpretation of
probabilities, instead of being developed, is only much too
quickly mentioned by Cozic. In the second part, Barberousse
deals with the interpretation of probability in physics (in
statistical mechanics and in quantum theory), and again, the
opposition between the objective interpretation and the
subjective one is mentioned in only one sentence (p. 417):
‘[the] minimal interpretation [of probabilistic functions] is that
they represent our inability to predict the result of certain
measurements’. The fact that such a crucial philosophical
question is only briefly mentioned reveals a lack of connection
between philosophy of science and philosophy of knowledge.
Sometimes this book gave me the feeling that philosophical
problems are met randomly in such or such a scientific theory,
without it being really possible to understand why these
problems are specifically philosophical. According to
Barberousse (p. 281), ‘Philosophy of science maintains a rich
dialog with metaphysics (see chapter 4) and epistemology, but
it has few links with philosophy of history, philosophy of law,
or political philosophy.’ Note that while it is difficult to
understand the nature of the philosophy of science apart from
epistemology and the ontological debates of metaphysics, it
would also be necessary to understand the meaning of the
word ‘philosophy’ in these different occurrences. A first
answer to this question would be to recall with Vuillemin
(1986) that, contrary to science, philosophy is essentially
polemical and that its own controversies have always been
recurrent in its history. It is true that philosophical polemics
appear clearly in chapter 10, where Bonnay and Dubucs deal
with the systematic oppositions between realism, nominalism
and intuitionism in philosophy of mathematics, but it is
unfortunate that this picture of the philosophy of mathematics
has not served as a guide to other chapters of this book.
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